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Abstract
The problem of distinguishing between a random function and a random permutation on
a domain of size N is important in theoretical cryptography, where the security of many prim-
itives depend on the problem’s hardness. We study the quantum query complexity of this
problem, and show that any quantum algorithm that solves this problem with bounded error
must make Ω(N1/5/polylogN) queries to the input function. Our lower bound proof uses a
combination of the Collision Problem lower bound and Ambainis’s adversary theorem.
1 Introduction
We study the quantum query complexity of distinguishing between a random function and a
random permutation on N elements, or the RP-RF problem (where RP stands for “random permu-
tation” and RF stands for “random function”). More precisely:
RP-RF problem. Let DP denote the uniform distribution over bijective functions mapping [N] to
[N] – i.e. the uniform distribution over all permutations. Let DF denote the uniform distribution
over functions mapping [N] to [N]. We say an algorithm A (classical or quantum) solves the
RP-RF problem on average with bias ǫ, iff
∣∣∣∣ Prf∼DF(A( f ) = 1)− Prf∼DP(A( f ) = 1)
∣∣∣∣ > ǫ,
where the probability is both over the distribution DF or DP , and the internal randomness of the
algorithm A. We note that solving this problem is equivalent to detecting a collision in a random
function mapping N elements to N elements.
We work with the query model of quantum algorithms, where the pertinent complexity mea-
sure of an algorithm is the number of queries made to the algorithm’s input. As is often the
case in the study of quantum query complexity, the number of computational steps is not con-
sidered. The study of quantum query complexity has been particularly fruitful. Optimal bounds
on the quantum query complexity of many problems have been established, including unordered
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search [6, 11], determining whether a function is 2-to-1 or 1-to-1 (known as the Collision Prob-
lem) [8, 4], and more. Perhaps most interestingly, there are problems for which there are exponen-
tial gaps between its classical query complexity and its quantum query complexity (e.g. Simon’s
Problem [16]).
In this paper, we show that there is a quantum algorithm that solves the RP-RF problem with
bias ǫ using O(
√
ǫN1/3) queries, and that any such algorithm must make Ω(ǫN1/5/polylogN)
queries. This rules out a superpolynomial speed-up from using quantum resources to solve the
problem; the classical (randomized) query complexity of the RP-RF problem is Θ(
√
ǫN) [9].
One motivation for studying the query complexity of the RP-RF problem comes from a bur-
geoning interest in showing that classical constructions of cryptographic primitives are secure
even against quantum computers (under plausible hardness assumptions). For example, the clas-
sical Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction of pseudorandom functions using pseudorandom
generators [10] was only recently shown to be secure against polynomial-time quantum comput-
ers by Zhandry [17]. A crucial element of his result was to show that the quantum query complex-
ity of distinguishing between functions drawn from so-called small range distributions, and truly
random functions, is large.
Zhandry posed the open question of whether one could similarly show that the classical
constructions of pseudorandom permutations (e.g., the Luby-Rackoff construction [13]) are secure
against time-bounded quantum computers [17]. Pseudorandom permutations are functions on
{0, 1}n that cannot be distinguished from a truly random permutation by any algorithm running
in time polynomial in n. They are central to the construction of block ciphers (e.g. the DES cipher):
while the ideal cipher would use truly random permutations, since a truly random permutation
requires an exponentially-sized description, pseudorandom permutations – which can be speci-
fied using a polynomial number of bits – are used instead.
An important step in the analysis of pseudorandom permutations is arguing that a classical
algorithmmaking polynomially many queries cannot distinguish between a random function and
a random permutation. If we were to try to carry the analysis over to the quantumworld, this step
would require that we prove a quantum query lower bound for this problem.
Here, we show that allowing quantum queries actually does not confer a significant advantage
in the number of queries needed for the RP-RF problem: we only get a modest polynomial speed-
up over classical queries. This gives hope that, in a similar way to Zhandry’s result, the classical
constructions of pseudorandom permutations [13, 15] can be shown to be secure against time-
bounded quantum computers (assuming one way functions are secure against quantum comput-
ers).
Proof strategy. The RP-RF problem is strongly reminiscent of the Collision Problem, where one
has to distinguish between an r-to-1 function and a 1-to-1 function, promised that one is the case. A
series of works [8, 2, 4] established that the query complexity of the Collision Problem is Θ( 3
√
N/r).
A random function f : [N] → [N] has some predictable structure: it can be thought of as the
result of an experiment where one throws N labelled balls into N labelled bins. The statistics of
the “balls into bins” experiment are well studied. For example, with high probability, f is 2-to-
1 on approximately 1/2e fraction of its domain, 3-to-1 on approximately 1/6e fraction, and so
on. Furthermore, with high probability, for all y ∈ [N], | f−1(y)| ≤ O(logN/ log logN). Thus, a
natural inclination is to somehow embed the Collision Problem into the RP-RF problem, in order
to use the Collision Problem lower bound.
We do exactly this, with some additional ideas. Using a hybrid argument, we show that any
2
algorithm A that solves the RP-RF problem with few queries must be able to distinguish between
a function with an r-to-1 part, and a functionwithout an r-to-1 part with few queries, which would
contradict the Collision lower bound provided that the r-to-1 part of the function was sufficiently
large. However, the Collision lower bound loses its effectiveness when this r-to-1 part is too small,
so in this case we switch to using Ambainis’s adversary theorem [3]. Trading off between these
two lower bound techniques gives us the Ω(N1/5/polylogN) lower bound on the RP-RF problem.
Finally, it is worth noting that our lower bound also applies to the problem of detecting a colli-
sion in a random function mapping [N] to [N] (i.e. finding inputs x, y such that f (x) = f (y)). In
fact, the query complexity of collision detection in a random function is equivalent to the RP-RF
problem.
Subsequent work. Shortly after this work, Zhandry was able to improve our Ω(N1/5/polylogN)
lower bound to the optimal Θ(N1/3) query lower bound for the RP-RF problem [19]. In fact, he
shows the more general result that detecting collisions in a random function f : [N] → [M] where
M = Ω(N1/2) requires Θ(N1/3) queries. He uses techniques from [18, 17] which are based on the
idea of expressing the acceptance probabilities of quantum algorithms as low degree polynomials
(also known as the polynomial method in quantum computing [5]). In particular, he avoids the
use of the adversary method, which is known to be useless for proving lower bounds on collision-
type problems [12] (this is also the reason why it is unlikely that our proof can be extended to
obtain a lower bound better than Ω(N1/5)).
2 Preliminaries
Before analyzing the query complexity of the RP-RF problem, we introduce some terminology
that will be useful later.
Definition 2.1. Let f : [N] → [N]. We say that a domain element x ∈ [N] has multiplicity u under f
iff | f−1( f (x))| = u.
Definition 2.2. Let f : [N] → [N]. The collision profile of f , denoted Col( f ), is a vector of non-negative
integers 〈b1, . . . , bN〉 such that there exists a partition of [N] = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SN , where for all i,
1. |Si| = bi (some Si may be empty), and
2. For all x ∈ Si, x has multiplicity i under f .
For example, the collision profile of a permutation f is Col( f ) = 〈N, 0, . . . , 0〉. More generally,
the collision profile of a r-to-1 function is the vector N · er, where er is the rth elementary basis
vector. When we write DC for some collision profile C, we mean the uniform distribution over
functions with collision profile C.
Definition 2.3. Let C = 〈b1, . . . , bN〉 be a collision profile for a function f : [N] → [N]. The maximum
load of C, denotedmaxload(C), is the largest i such that bi 6= 0.
Let f , g : [N] → [N]. We say that f and g are collision equivalent iff Col( f ) = Col(g). It is
easy to see that the relation induced by collision equivalence is an equivalence relation on the set
of all functions mapping [N] to [N]. We will generally identify the equivalence classes with their
corresponding collision profiles. We will abuse notation and write f ∈ C to denote a function with
collision profile C. For a quantum algorithm A, we will use Q(A) to denote its quantum query
complexity.
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Definition 2.4 (Good profile). Let C = {b1, . . . , bN} be a collision profile for functions mapping [N] to
[N]. C is good iffmaxload(C) < 3 logN/ log logN.
Claim 2.5. Let f be a random function drawn from DF . Then Pr(Col( f ) is good) ≥ 1− 1/N.
Proof. This follows from standard “balls in bins” arguments (see, e.g., Lemma 5.1 in [14], for a
proof).
3 An upper bound
We show that allowing quantum queries gives a slight advantage of classical queries for the RP-RF
problem. The classical query complexity of solving the RP-RF problem with bias ǫ is Ω(
√
ǫN) –
see [9] for a proof.
Theorem 3.1. The quantum query complexity of solving the RP-RF problem on average with bias ǫ is
O(
√
ǫN1/3).
Proof. We use the the collision-finding algorithm of Brassard, Hoyer, Tapp [8]. The algorithm
works as follows:
• Pick a set T ⊆ [N] of size k = N1/3 at random. Query the value of f (x) for every x ∈ T, and
store the values (x, f (x)) in a table L.
• If there exists distinct x, y ∈ T such that f (x) = f (y), output “1”.
• Construct the oracle H(x) such that H(x) = 1 iff there exists a s ∈ T such that f (x) = L(s),
where L(s) denotes the stored value f (s) in L.
• Execute Grover’s algorithm on oracle H to find an x ∈ [N] such that H(x) = 1. If there exists
one, output “1”. Otherwise, output “0” (for random permutation).
Clearly, if the input function is a random permutation, then the algorithm will always output
“0”. Suppose that f were drawn from DF . With high probability, there exists a set S ⊆ [N] of size
≈ (1− 1/e)N such that for every x ∈ S, there exists a y 6= x in S where f (x) = f (y).
If there were a collision in T, we are done; computing the table L requires O(N1/3) queries to
f . Otherwise, the number of x ∈ [N] such that H(x) = 1 is, with high probability, approximately
|S| · |T|/N = Ω(|T|) = Ω(N1/3). Thus, Grover’s algorithm will find a collision with probability
Ω(ǫ) in O(
√
ǫN1/3) queries [7], and the collision-finding algorithm will output “1”.
4 An average-case to worst-case reduction
We first show that any efficient algorithm A that can solve the RP-RF problem on average can be
transformed into an efficient algorithm B that solves a restricted form of the RP-RF problem, but
in the worst case. This “restriction” is that B is only guaranteed to distinguish between a random
permutation, and a random function with a specific collision profile.
Claim 4.1 (Average case to worst case). Let A be a quantum algorithm that solves the RP-RF problem
on average, with bias ǫ > 2/N. Then there exists an a good collision profile C, and a quantum algorithm B
that makes O( 1
ǫ
Q(A)) queries, such that
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1. For all f ∈ C, Pr(B( f ) = 1) ≥ 2/3, and
2. For all f ∈ P , Pr(B( f ) = 1) ≤ 1/3.
In this case, we say that the algorithm B distinguishes between C and P , with bounded error.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that Pr f∼DF (A( f ) = 1) − Pr f∼DP (A( f ) = 1) > ǫ (i.e.
without the absolute value bars). We can rewrite this as
E
R
E
f∼DR
[A( f )]− E
f∼DP
[A( f )] > ǫ,
where R is a random collision profile, distributed so that sampling R, then sampling a function
f ∼ DR is equivalent to sampling f from DF directly. Let p := ER E f∼DR [A( f )]. Define R to be
the set of collision profiles such that for all R ∈ R, E f∼DR [A( f )] ≥ p− ǫ/2. Then, we have that
Pr(R) · 1+ (1− Pr(R)) · (p− ǫ/2) ≥ p.
Since p ≥ ǫ, it must be that Pr(R) ≥ ǫ/2. By Claim 2.5, there must exist a profile C ∈ R that is
good, because PrC(C ∈ R, C is good) ≥ Pr(R)− PrC(C is not good) ≥ ǫ/2− 1/N > 0. Fix such
a good C. Thus,
E
f∼DC
[A( f )]− E
f∼DP
[A( f )] > ǫ/2,
where DC denotes the uniform distribution over functions with collision profile C. Now consider
the following algorithm B′, which takes a function f : [N] → [N] as input:
• Pick random and independent permutations π, σ on [N].
• Simulate A, and whenever Amakes a query to the xth element of its input, for some x ∈ [N],
return π( f (σ(x))).
• Return the output of A.
Suppose that the input to B′ were a function f ∈ C. Then, for random permutations π, σ,
π( f (σ)) is uniformly distributed over C. This is because set of permutation pairs (π, σ) ∈ SN × SN
that leave a function f : [N] → [N] invariant forms a subgroup. If f ∈ P , then f is a uniformly
random permutation. Thus, for all f ∈ C, Pr(B′( f ) = 1) = E f∈DC [A( f )], and for all f ∈ P ,
Pr(B′( f ) = 1) = E f∈DP [A( f )]. Thus, B
′ is an algorithm that makes Q(A) queries and distin-
guishes between an arbitrary function f in C and an arbitrary permutation in P with bias ǫ/2.
Using standard amplitude estimation techniques [7], from B′ we obtain an algorithm B that dis-
tinguishes betweenC andP in theworst case, with bounded error, makingO( 1
ǫ
Q(A)) queries.
5 The lower bound proof
We now prove that any algorithm B that distinguishes between C and P for some good collision
profile C must make a large number of queries. We do this by exhibiting O(logN) hybrid distri-
butionsH0, . . . ,Hr such thatH0 = DP ,Hr = DC, and argue that distinguishing between any two
adjacent hybrids requires large query complexity.
Let C = 〈c1, . . . , cN〉. Partition [N] as {1} ∪ Iempty ∪ Ismall ∪ Ilarge, where
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1. Iempty = {i : ci = 0, i > 1},
2. Ismall = {i : ci < Nd, i > 1}, and
3. Ilarge = {i : ci ≥ Nd, i > 1},
for some parameter d ∈ (0, 1) that we will optimize later. Write Ilarge = {i1, . . . , iq}. Let r = q+ 1,
and define the following sequence of collision profiles:
• H0 = 〈N, 0, . . . , 0〉 (i.e., the collision profile of a permutation).
• For all 1 ≤ j ≤ q, Hj is the collision profile 〈hj1, . . . , hjN〉, where hj1 = N − (ci1 + · · · + cij),
hjik = cik for all k = 1, . . . , j, and otherwise hji = 0,
• Hq+1 = C.
We then define the hybrid distribution Hj to be the uniform distribution over Hj for each
j. Note that, since C is good, maxload(C) = max Ismall ∪ Ilarge < 3 logN/ log logN. Thus, the
number of hybrids is q+ 2 = O(logN).
In other words, starting with the permutation collision profile, we gradually “morph” the
hybrid collision profiles into the final collision profile C. We do so by adding the ci-to-1 parts (for
large ci), one by one, to the hybrid profiles, until we only have small ci left. We then add all the
small ci together to the last hybrid profile at once.
Claim 5.1. Let B be a quantum algorithm that distinguishes between C and P with bounded error. Then
there exists an 1 ≤ j ≤ q + 1, and a quantum algorithm B′ that makes O (qQ(B)) queries, and distin-
guishes between Hj−1 and Hj with bounded error.
Proof. Since B distinguishes between C and P , B also distinguishes between DC and DP in an
average-case sense. Then, by the triangle inequality, we have that there exists an 1 ≤ j ≤ q+ 1
such that ∣∣∣∣∣ Ef∼Hj−1[B( f )]− Ef∼Hj[B( f )]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ Ω
(
1
q
)
.
In a similar way to the proof of Claim 4.1, we then obtain the desired algorithm B′.
We divide the analysis into two cases: j < q+ 1 and j = q+ 1.
Lemma 5.2. If j < q+ 1, then Q(B′) = Ω
((
Nd
logN
)1/3)
.
Proof. Since j < q+ 1, the hybrid collision profiles Hj−1 and Hj differ by one “collision type” cij .
That is, Hj contains a ij-to-1 part, and Hj−1 doesn’t. We now reduce the ij-to-1 collision problem
to the problem of distinguishing between Hj−1 and Hj. We will “embed” a function that is either
cij-to-1 or 1-to-1 into a function from either Hj or Hj−1, respectively.
Define gk = ci1 + · · ·+ cik , for k = 1, . . . , j. We will define g0 = 0. Let f be a function mapping
[cij ] to [cij ]. Now let h f : [N] → [N] be defined as follows:
1. For all 1 ≤ k < j, h f restricted to {gk−1 + 1, . . . , gk} is an arbitrarily chosen ik-to-1 function
with range that’s a subset of {gk−1 + 1, . . . , gk}.
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2. For all x ∈ {gj−1 + 1, . . . , gj}, h f (x) = f (x) + gj−1.
3. For all x ∈ {gj + 1, . . . ,N}, h f (x) = x.
Consider the following algorithm G, on input f : [cij ] → [cij ]:
• Simulate algorithm B′ on input h f .
• Return the output of B′.
Observe that Q(G) = Q(B′). Now, if f were a 1-to-1 function, then h f ∈ Hj−1. Otherwise, if f
were a ij-to-1 function, then h f ∈ Hj. Since B′ distinguishes between Hj−1 and Hj, G distinguishes
between ij-to-1 functions and 1-to-1 functions. By the collision lower bound of Aaronson, Shi, and
Ambainis [2, 4], G (and hence B′) must make Ω
(
(cij/ij)
1/3
)
queries. Since j < q+ 1, we have that
cij ≥ Nd and since C is good we have ij < logN.
Lemma 5.3. If j = q+ 1, then Q(B′) = Ω
(√
N
Nd logN
)
.
Proof. We adapt the proof of Lemma 16 from [1] (which is an application of Ambainis’s adversary
theorem) to this situation, to show that distinguishing between Hq and Hq+1 requires at least
Ω
(√
N
Nd logN
)
queries.
Let Ismall = {w1, . . . ,wr}. These are all the integers u such that the number of domain elements
in [N] that have multiplicity u is less than Nd. By definition of Ismall, we obtain the bound v :=
cw1 + · · ·+ cwr < maxload(C)Nd < Nd logN. Define a relation R ⊆ Hq+1× Hq, where ( f1, f2) ∈ R
iff one can transform f1 to f2 in the following way:
1. Let S = {x ∈ [N] : x has multiplicity ws under f1 for some 1 ≤ s ≤ r}.
2. Define an intermediate function f˜ that is identical to f1 except on S, f˜ (S) ⊆ f1(S) ∪ ([N] −
f1([N])), and | f˜ (S)| = |S| (i.e. f˜ is 1-to-1 on S, or that f˜ ∈ Hq).
3. f2 is equal to f˜ , except for every x ∈ S, there exists a unique y ∈ [N] − S such that f2(y) =
f˜ (x) and f2(x) = f˜ (y).
Equivalently, ( f1, f2) ∈ R iff there is a transformation from f2 to f1 by a similar procedure:
1. Let S ⊆ {x ∈ [N] : x has multiplicity 1 under f2} be such that |S| = cw1 + · · ·+ cwr = v.
2. Define an intermediate function f˜ that is identical to f2 except on S, f˜ (S) ⊆ f2(S), and
f˜ ∈ Hq+1.
3. f1 is equal to f˜ , except for every x ∈ S, there exists a unique y ∈ [N] − S such that f1(y) =
f˜ (x) and f1(x) = f˜ (y).
By an analysis similar to that in [1], using Ambainis’s adversary theorem, we get that Q(B′) =
Ω
(√
N
v
)
= Ω
(√
N
Nd logN
)
.
Theorem 5.4. Let A be a quantum algorithm that solves the RP-RF problem on average, with bias ε >
2/N. Then Q(A) = Ω
(
ǫN1/5
log3/2 N
)
.
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Proof. We balance the lower bounds from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 by setting d = 3/5, which gives
us that Q(B′) = Ω (N1/5/√logN). Then, since Claim 5.1 gives us that algorithm Q(B′) =
O(qQ(B)), B must make Ω
(
N1/5
log3/2 N
)
queries (because q = O(logN)), and Claim 4.1 gives that
algorithm Amust make Ω
(
ǫN1/5
log3/2 N
)
queries.
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